The artillery round that killed Virgil Surber was fired early that morning while the men were heating their 10 in 1 rations. The mortar platoon was about 40-50 yards from the company C.P. They were down the ridge and below us, and I could see them plainly The round burst in the air, and there seemed to be no unusual activity such as yelling "medic". As a consequence I was stunned to learn that Surber was dying. Just one single air burst that seemed so insignificant.

Soon after this the 1st platoon reported a Jap digging a hole at a long distance, to their front. Their M-1 did not disturb him, and they wanted the sniper rifle - the Springfied 03-A3 with telescope. I had been carrying the rifle, since my weapon did not matter much. I took the rifle to them along with some Blue Goose ammunition. (These were incendiary bullets used by the Air Corps, specifically the Australian Beaufighters,  which still numbered 30 caliber machine guns in their armament. These bullets were excellent to spot the point of impact because you could see a point of flame there.  We set the scope at zero windage and 1000 yards range. Bill McDonald was selected to be the shooter. The Jap had his back to us and was about knee deep in the hole he was digging. He would straighten up throwing the dirt over his shoulder and then bend forward away from us as he dug in with his shovel. Bill fired and the Blue Goose flamed a couple of inches above where the Jap's suspenders crossed. The body lay there for days and could be seen from the road after it was extended up into that area. The body lay on the side of the hill with the feet still in the hole, indicating our enemy had died instantly.

We received orders to move across the road to the south side. AA guns were being emplaced in forward positions to give us direct fire support. A quad fifty mounted on a trailer (four .50 caliber machine guns) and a 90mm were attached to our battalion. The 90 was emplaced on a high prominence on the south side of the road. A revetment consisting of several rows of sand bags was built around the gun. This gun faced a deep valley with the ridges running to the southeast.  We moved down into this valley and up on to two parallel ridges to the southeast of the gun, about three hundred yards away. Tokaido road had been completed to the gun, and the trail continued on along the north side of the north ridge of the two parallel ridges we were occupying. We set up a perimeter defense here.

That afternoon I was called to report to the battalion command post.    It was located near the 90mm gun. "F" Company was given the mission of taking the high ground. The ridges led to some 400-500 yards to our front. We were to dig in immediately upon seizing the objective, preparing to repel a counterattack. The position was a very strong defensive position. The armored vehicles could not be used in this rugged terrain, so we would have strong  artillery and mortar support. A battalion of corps artillery, 155mm rifles (Long Toms), would be used to support us along with 4.2 mortars, battalion 81mm mortars, and our own 60mm mortars would be take part in the supporting fires. This was the first time we would have such support. Even so, we knew how deep the Japs dug in, so we were not expect-miracles. I personally would have much rather had an M-7, but that was out.

After being briefed and receiving my orders I took the shortest route back to the company, which was down the trail into the valley, up the valley crossing under the 90mm (perhaps 100 feet above), and on to the ridge where our C.P. was located. Just as I got in front of the 90,  it fired. Although it was far above me the concussion almost knocked me to my knees. I would never walk in front of one of those things again.

About this time the mystery of the Jap dual purpose gun was solved. The Jap crew made the fatal error of firing at the 90, and they were only 600-700 yards away. The HE shell hit the outer wall of the revetment protecting the 90. Aside  from throwing up a lot of sand and damaging some of the outer rows, no real damage had been done. But someone in the 90 crew had seen the muzzle flash in the side of the hill. The 90 fired several rounds,  and the side of the hill seemed to explode with dirt, logs and debris flying through the air. Lying among the logs was the gun barrel on the lower slope of the hill. Several feet were missing from the muzzle. The remaining barrel was split and spread out like a blunderbuss. Looking west toward the sea we could see all the way to the coconut grove, several miles away, where Donaldson was killed 10 April. We never found another gun in this area and felt this was the gun that had been firing on us and the tank.

Several days before this, while we were still a mile or so away, our artillery and mortars had caught a resupply train of mules bringing in supplies to the Japs. This was in a draw not far to the north of the 75mm dual purpose gun. After we had begun our advance against the Japs every few days the Japs would rake our front lines with intense machine gun and mortar fire for 15 to 20 minutes. These sudden attacks would put us down deep in our foxholes. There had to be a reason for these outbursts so during one of the attacks, someone kept a close observation of the enemy lines. Sure enough, a good distance to the east a mule train was spotted coming over a ridge. In a short time our artillery and mortars rained in on the draw into which the train was heading. This stopped Japanese resupply. I was later told that our troops who went into that draw found a lot of dead mules. Nothing is mentioned in the periodic reports, so maybe it had been just us who had thought that the Japanese efforts had been hurt.

But then, what do front line soldiers know?